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1 Introduction
It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to offer my comments on the paper “The
Drivers of Housing Cycles in Spain” by Oriol Aspachs-Bracons and Pau Rabanal. The
authors address an important and timely question. The sharp contraction in the housing
sector is a key feature of the economic downturns in the US, UK, Ireland and Spain.
The authors tackle a particularly complex issue as several factors, including monetary
policy, the compression of risk premia and financial innovation, are all likely to have
played a role. Understanding the role played by low interest rates is of first order
importance for policy makers at central banks. In my opinion, the model the authors
set up is a good starting point for studying the spillovers from the housing market to
the rest of the economy. However, other important features, such as nominal wage
rigidities and indexation and credit supply, should be considered in order to enhance
the ability of the model to fit the data and to shed light, in particular, on the role of
monetary policy in the last housing market cycle in Spain. Overall, I find the empirical
analysis presented in the paper valuable and interesting.
2 Overview of the paper
Aspachs and Rabanal rely on a two-country, two-sector New Keynesian model of the
European Monetary Union in which one country represents Spain and the other the
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rest of the countries. They estimate the model over the period 1995–2008 using Bayes-
ian methods and carry out some exercises that are meant to understand the “drivers” of
the housing cycle in Spain. The model allows for imperfect labor mobility between the
residential and the consumption sectors and for sticky prices. The role of borrowing
constrained households is considered in Sect. 4 of the paper in which the robustness
of the results is tested. Two-sector models with constrained households have been
shown to be able to explain several features of the data such as the response of resi-
dential investment and consumption to monetary policy and housing demand shocks
(Monacelli 2007; Iacoviello and Neri 2010). The authors put forward two potential
explanations for the housing boom in Spain. According to the first one, the decline of
interest rates during the run up to the establishment of the European Monetary Union in
1999 created the conditions for a strong expansion of demand for housing. The second
explanation relates to demographic trends and population growth which was faster in
Spain than in other EMU countries, partially reflecting immigration. The model allows
for these two possible explanations as it incorporates monetary policy and housing
preference shocks. The latter shocks can be seen as capturing in reduced form all the
factors affecting aggregate demand for housing that are not explicitly modeled, includ-
ing demographic ones. The variance decomposition (Table 4 in the paper) is used to
assess the relative importance of monetary policy and housing demand shocks for both
residential investment and real house prices. While the first shock explains a negligible
fraction of the variability of both variables, shocks to preferences account for a large
fraction, around 50 and 35% of the fluctuations of, respectively, prices and quantities.
The key result of the paper is that monetary policy did not contribute to the housing
cycle while demand factors were responsible for the boom and the bust. In light of
these results, a natural question arises. Could the limited role of monetary policy be a
consequence of the weak propagation mechanism as several real and nominal frictions
(i.e., nominal wage rigidities and indexation to inflation), which have been shown to
be important in accounting for the delayed effects of policy shocks (Christiano et al.
2005), are missing from the model. Could the model be misspecified in such a way
that it is not able to disentangle the two explanations? To put it in other words, could
it be possible that the housing preference shifter captures also the effects of monetary
policy? I address this concern in the next section.
3 Housing demand shocks: what do they capture?
In order to understand whether the estimated innovations are correlated with demo-
graphic variables I estimated the following equation (Evans 1992; Iacoviello and Neri
2010):
u jt = A(L)u jt−1 + B(L)xt−1 + vt (1)
where vt is a mean zero, i.i.d. normally distributed random variable and A(L) and B(L)
are polynomials in the lag operator L . I include in the vector xt the following variables:
total population growth (source National Accounts), immigrants population growth
(annual data, linearly interpolated to the quarterly frequency; source INE, Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica), the real 3-month interest rate (the nominal rate, source ECB,
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Table 1 Predictability of housing preference innovations
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Significance level
Immigrant population growth 0.119 3.546 0.0004
3-Month real interest rate −1.457 3.138 0.0017
Securitisation (% loans) 0.543 2.100 0.0349






Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors
minus Consensus forecast inflation expectations) and the ratio of securitised loans to
total loans to the private sector (source ECB). The first two variables are meant to cap-
ture demographic factors behind housing demand. The real interest rate is introduced
in order to assess the likely misspecification of the model concerning the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. A statistically significant coefficient on this variable
would highlight an important misspecification of the model. Finally, the last variable
may capture the effects of financial innovation on housing demand. In Table 1 I report
the results from the best specification (all coefficients are significant at the 5% confi-
dence level) of Eq. (1) in which I have used one lag for each explanatory variable and
one lag of the estimated innovations.
The Table shows that the variables I considered have the expected signs and are all
significant at the 5% confidence level. On the contrary, total population growth is not
significant. The R2 is 0.42. An increase in immigrants population, a low short-term
real interest rate and a higher level of securitisation are all associated with an increase
in the demand for housing, consistently with my a priori. If I exclude the lag of the
innovations from the regression the fit worsen (the R2 falls to 0.33); however, immi-
grant population growth and the real interest rate are both still significant while this is
not the case for securitisation. If I include the mortgage rate (source Banco de España)
instead of the real interest rate, the fit increases to 0.45. Figure 1 plots actual and fitted
values from the preferred regression.
The take-away message is the following. While it is good news that the housing
preference shock captures demographic factors, it is bad news to find that the short-
term real interest rate, which is controlled by monetary policy, has predictive power
for housing demand. This finding suggests that it may be worth checking whether
these results still go through once other real and nominal frictions are added to the
model in order to improve the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
4 Conclusions
To conclude, the paper provides an important attempt to understanding the drivers of
the housing market in Spain over the last decade. The topic is highly relevant since
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Fig. 1 Actual innovations to the housing preference shock and fitted values
the rapid and sharp correction in the housing market has led to a strong increase in the
unemployment rate and in mortgages foreclosures. However, more effort should be
devoted in future research in better modeling the transmission mechanism of mone-
tary policy, possibly by including a banking system and the supply of credit, and other
rigidities. The paper by Aspachs and Rabanal constitutes an important first step in the
direction of understanding the role of housing markets in a monetary union. I look
forward to future research on this topic.
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